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COGNITIVE GRAMMAR: THE STATE OF THE ART
AND RELATED ISSUES: AN INTERVIEW WITH
RONALD LANGACKER*
józsef andor
Abstract
In this interview with the founder of cognitive grammar as a model of description the
following major issues have been raised and discussed: (i) relations between models of
cognitive linguistics: cognitive grammar vs. construction grammar; (ii) the nature of
lexical representation: the scope of wordhood vs. expressions; (iii) the nature and role
of domains vs. types of conceptual structure such as scenes, frames, and scripts; (iv) the
status and scope of active zones in linguistic description; (v) the nature of economy
in linguistic representation at various levels— lexical semantic vs. lexical pragmatic
issues; (vi) the treatment of part of speech relatedness in cognitive grammar, with
special emphasis on the status of adjectives; (vii) the notion of linguistic modularity.
Andor: Thank you very much for accepting my call for an interview.
I am honored to have a chance to talk to one of the founding fathers
of cognitive linguistics, founder of the paradigm called cognitive gram-
mar, in Budapest. My first question particularly concerns the relation
between cognitive linguistics and cognitive grammar itself as a model. In
the course of the past few decades cognitive-based studies of language have
gained more and more ground, mainly as an alternative to the Chomskyan
type of generative grammar and other types of formalistic or logically
based linguistic theoretical paradigms. A number of models have been
presented. We have to note, however, that an important common fea-
ture of all of them is that they are deeply rooted in studying the cognitive
sources or bases of language, linguistic representation and expressibility.
That is to say, they all share a common core: cognition. How do you view
your own model, that of cognitive grammar, which I think constitutes one
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of the mainstreams of research with such a bias, among the varieties of
models of cognitive linguistics? Basically, I would like you to comment
on the relation and differences between the so-called ‘cognitive linguistics’
and ‘cognitive grammar’.
Langacker: I am not sure that there are differences. How much is sub-
sumed under cognitive linguistics, of course, is a very flexible matter. It
could be construed very broadly. Some people would include, for example,
Jackendoff’s work under cognitive linguistics. I generally include Anna
Wierzbicka’s work under cognitive linguistics, and construction grammar
in its various guises. So it is a broad view that could be construed more
narrowly, e.g., to include people who would normally go to the ICLC
(the International Cognitive Linguistics Conference). That would, for
example, exclude Jackendoff, and I would also exclude him from cogni-
tive linguistics (in the narrower sense) due to his belief in the autonomy
of grammar. Thus, instead of saying that cognitive grammar is different
from cognitive linguistics, I would say that it is only one version of it.
Arguably, however, it is the best articulated and worked out as a compre-
hensive framework, with the possible exception of construction grammar
(in which many more people are specifically working). Cognitive grammar
is meant to be a potentially comprehensive model of language structure.
I’ve tried to design it in such a way that it can be an umbrella for all the
varied research done in cognitive and even functional linguistics. Many
different levels and dimensions of linguistic structure can be approached
through cognitive grammar, even if they have not been equally explored.
For example, there can and should be a cognitive phonology. I have dis-
cussed numerous aspects of phonology in various places, although I have
not tried to work out a comprehensive account (not having been trained
as a phonologist). I think there can and will eventually be a cognitive
lexicography using the ideas of cognitive grammar. Sociolinguistic ques-
tions, diachronic problems like grammaticization, language acquisition—
these can all be approached using the cognitive grammar framework. So
even though relatively few people in cognitive linguistics actually do cog-
nitive grammar per se and work out descriptions in terms of it, I still
think of it as a potential umbrella, as something which can ultimately
model the various results being achieved in cognitive linguistics.
Andor: Recently, one can experience some sort of a merging, or at
least some sort of a linking between cognitive grammar and a more and
more intensively emerging field: construction grammar. You yourself
tackled the relations between these models in your plenary lecture given
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recently at an important conference on cognitive linguistics in Logroño,
Spain (2003). Let me add to this that Ray Jackendoff, who still considers
himself a generativist, has also recently expressed his sympathy with con-
structionist types of grammar. Do you think that construction grammar,
as outlined by Croft, Goldberg and others, and your model of cognitive
grammar should go together as parallel, but quite closely related models,
or perhaps, that they could or even should be merged in some way?
Langacker: I think you have to separate the basic idea of construc-
tionism from the more general ideas of cognitive grammar and cognitive
linguistics. Even people in generative grammar now talk more in terms
of templates and constraints than in terms of rules (in the classic sense of
rewriting rules and derivations from underlying structures). So I think the
basic idea has basically been established quite broadly. It was fundamen-
tal to cognitive grammar from the start, many years ago. It has become
common even in generative approaches. And of course it is a basic no-
tion of Fillmore’s construction grammar: the idea that constructions are
the basic objects of description is one parallelism between construction
grammar and cognitive grammar.
Andor: I did not refer to Fillmore as he never published the book version
of it.
Langacker: That’s right. In any case, these ideas were worked out
independently at about the same time. I didn’t talk about ‘constructions’
as the object of description—that was originally Fillmore’s term. I never
thought to use the term, but if you look at my model, that’s exactly
what it is, of course. So there are many similarities between construction
grammar (in all its versions) and cognitive grammar, just because of that
common starting point: constructions as the basic objects of description,
as well as a basic vehicle of description. Also the idea that constructions
reduce to form-meaning pairings. That’s a common idea, up to a point.
There are also many differences which I have talked about in various
places, one being that paper from the Logroño conference, which will
soon be published in a volume based on the conference proceedings.
There I looked particularly at Croft’s radical construction grammar
(2001) and Goldberg’s version of classic construction grammar (1995).
There’s one major difference, which is really the fundamental difference
between cognitive grammar and those other kinds of construction gram-
mar. It reflects the fact that Fillmore and the people who have followed
him have never even tried to totally reduce grammar to meaning and
symbolic relationships. There are still—and this is what I tried to point
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out at various places—vestiges of autonomous grammar in construction
grammar. As formulated, this is true of both Croft’s version and Gold-
berg’s version. It is apparent when they talk about what goes into a
form-meaning pairing. As for meaning, people working in construction
grammar tend not to do very much with it, at least with meaning in
my sense of the term. They don’t get into the details of construal, and
they usually don’t bring in metaphor, fictivity, or mental spaces. These
fundamental matters tend to be omitted in construction grammar, at
least in practice. I don’t know how people feel about it in principle.
But certainly, basic ideas like construal, profiling, trajector-landmark
organization, perspective, metaphor, etc. are not very visible in their
analyses. Still, there is agreement that meaning figures in grammatical
description. Now what about form? In discussions of construction gram-
mar, what is referred to as ‘form’ includes not just phonology, but also
grammatical form. Indications of grammatical category (like noun and
verb) and grammatical relations (like subject and object) are adopted as
semantically unanalyzed notions. Though subsumed under form, they
are not phonological and not perceptually observable. What I tried to
show in the paper mentioned, among other things, was that in cognitive
grammar ‘form’ is limited to phonology and other symbolizing structures
—e.g., gesture—but does not include syntactic categories, nor grammat-
ical relations. Despite the traditional terminology, referring to these as
matters of ‘form’ is inappropriate. I analyze those notions in terms of
symbolic relationships. A noun, for example, is not something which has
a meaning, a phonological representation, and another aspect of form,
namely its status as a noun. Rather, it is something which has a mean-
ing and a phonological representation, being a noun precisely because of
what kind of meaning it has. Status as a noun is not something distinct.
So, whereas in the other versions of construction grammar the ‘form’
part of form-meaning pairings includes aspects of grammar, for me form
is limited to phonology (and other symbolizing structures). All aspects
of grammar are inherent in the pairing of those other two. Grammar is
not something that participates in symbolic relationships as part of what
is doing the symbolization. Rather, it is implicit in the symbolic rela-
tionships themselves, where these reduce to meanings and phonological
structures.
Andor: One of the interesting issues related to your theory concerns the
status and scope of the linguistic notion and concept of ‘word’. You don’t
seem to use the notion to serve as a linguistic unit. What you do use,
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systematically, is the term ‘expression’. However, ‘expression’ seems to
have a broader status in your theory. One can say, it has even a differ-
ent scope. I mean, even full utterances can be taken to be expressions,
but single lexical items can also have such a status. If I understand you
correctly, expressions emerge as units in discourse, which suggests to me
that they are units of performance, and that thus they have a high rate
of flexibility of content under the dominance of the particular ‘domain’
that they linguistically map. Can you clarify and outline the notions of
‘expression’ and ‘lexical item’ as linguistic units in your view (you do
tend to use the term ‘lexical item’ rather than ‘word’ in your papers and
books—1987, 425–8; 1990; 1999a, b), and reflect on their relation to the
conventional notion of wordhood? Actually, let me note that John Taylor,
who is also a cognitivist, uses the term ‘word’ in Chapter 9 of his volu-
minous textbook on cognitive grammar published in 2002 and elsewhere
(talking about the taxonomy of symbolic units), and you cannot find the
term ‘expression’ in the index of that book.
Langacker: Well, Taylor was doing what he was doing for purposes of
writing a textbook, and I think he was probably following the traditional
textbook practice of talking about words in a rather informal way. Let
me not address that seriously; I think that was done for practical reasons.
First, a preliminary terminological point. I use the term ‘unit’ in a
technical sense, as something which has become an established cognitive
routine. So technically speaking, a novel expression cannot be a unit, nor
can we talk of “units of performance”.
Now, the word ‘word’ is very much abused by linguists in writing
textbooks and elsewhere. It’s very common in textbooks of English to
talk about lexical items as words. You can get away with that in English,
because so many lexical items are pretty much coextensive with words,
we don’t have a highly inflected morphology, and so on. But in general we
need to distinguish a ‘lexical item’ or ‘lexeme’ from a ‘word’. In polysyn-
thetic languages, or any language with a lot of complex morphology, a
‘word’ is usually a ‘novel expression’ in some way. There is typically
a lexical stem plus a number of derivational and inflectional elements,
and while each of these is familiar individually the totality is quite often
novel. So for me—and I’m being conservative here—a word is the kind
of thing you would write with spaces around it in a European language.
Or to take the classic Bloomfieldian definition, a word is a minimal free
form, and a word boundary a natural place to pause (1933, 177–89). I
think a word is a kind of psychological unit, at least in certain kinds of
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languages. And for me it’s basically a phonological unit. I don’t have
much by way of a cognitive grammar analysis, so I haven’t used it or
tried to define it technically. But I do mean to limit ‘word’ to “words” in
the ordinary sense of the term, things you write with spaces (assuming
the practice were rationalized a bit). Understood in this way, we can-
not talk about a language consisting of words, or people just producing
words. You need some other term for what I call ‘expressions’. You are
right that the term ‘expression’ is used very broadly here. Besides words,
it includes phrases, entire sentences, entire utterances, i.e., any kind of
utterance of any size. There is no reason why sequences of sentences
could not be called ‘expressions’, but in practice I use the term only up
to the sentence level. And you do need some term: if you want to talk
about grammar in a general way, you cannot talk just about words, or
about phrases, or about clauses. You need something for raw data of
any size, and ‘expression’ is what I use. It’s not really a technical term,
so I haven’t defined it carefully, but in volume 1 of Foundations there is
quite a long section about the subtleties of this notion (1987, 425-8). It
is not self-explanatory, and what counts as an ‘expression’ depends on
the purpose of one’s analysis, how closely you look at the data.
In my view terms like ‘lexical item’ and ‘lexicon’ are also much
abused, being used in different ways often based on gratuitous assump-
tions. The only definition that makes sense to me, one that is useful and
approximates the traditional understanding of it, is to define a ‘lexical
item’ as a ‘fixed expression’. It’s not coextensive with ‘word’, it’s not
coextensive with expressions that are in some way unpredictable or ir-
regular. For me, then, a ‘lexical item’ is something you would list in a
dictionary as a fixed expression—an expression that people learn as a
unit, regardless of its size. In many languages it is typically smaller than
a word, but there is no reason not to regard fixed expressions larger than
words as lexical items, since there is no natural stopping point. So these
terms have different functions, and I try to use all of them in a fairly tra-
ditional and consistent sense. A ‘word’ is basically a phonological unit,
‘expression’ is a general term for sequences that are produced and need
to be analyzed, and ‘lexical items’ are fixed expressions.
Andor: With this notion of expressions and wordhood as outlined, what
do you think of the role and status of dictionaries as linguistic aids for
native and non-native speakers of a language? What do they represent?
And, in particular, what sort of, what type of information should they
represent? Ongoing research in frame-based semantics, which I would
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rather term ’frame-based pragmatics’, suggests that dictionaries of the fu-
ture should be frame-based, they should provide a more thorough and pre-
cise representation of world, that is, conceptual, encyclopaedically-based
knowledge. Research with a related scope of interest, called WordNet, is
carried out in Princeton. By the way, cognitive grammar claims to be an
encyclopaedically-based model of representing linguistic conceptualization.
Langacker: Your question is largely practical, and I’m not a very prac-
tical person. So my answer will be rather limited.
The notion of semantics being encyclopaedic in scope simply means
that linguistic expressions, and lexical items in particular, are not vessels
full of content. Instead they give us semi-structured ways of accessing
conceptual content which is largely there for independent reasons. And
there is no principled dividing line between what can be evoked via lexi-
cal items and general knowledge. I think this is very important to realize
from a theoretical standpoint. The point is crucial if you want to un-
derstand language, how it works, how it’s represented psychologically,
and how it relates to the rest of cognition. But this doesn’t translate
into descriptive practice of any principled or any practical sort. Taking
the point seriously would actually imply that it’s impossible to write a
dictionary, if you understand a dictionary as characterizing how speak-
ers represent things in their own minds. A real dictionary is necessarily
artificial, in the sense that it has to be limited in scope. But this doesn’t
mean that people shouldn’t write dictionaries or grammars for practi-
cal purposes. And those practical concerns dictate what should go into
them. What thoughts I have on the matter are not based on detailed re-
search or detailed lexicography of either a practical or a theoretical sort.
For an optimal dictionary, I think that examples are very important to
show how expressions are actually used. Something that is really critical,
and typically left out of dictionaries, are indications of the normal ways
of phrasing things in the language. I know this from personal experi-
ence. I studied various languages in college, and was good at studying
them the way they were taught in those days, and in some places still
are. That is, I’d learn all the lexical items presented in a course, and
mastered everything in the grammar book. But this itself does not guar-
antee real fluency or the practical ability to use a language effortlessly
in everyday conversation. Part of the problem is register, part of it is
diglossia, part of it is not being exposed enough to the culture and all
the things members of the culture talk about from day to day. There
is a vast amount of background knowledge required to bridge the gap
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between the way languages are classically taught and what is needed to
use them in practice. But one particular factor stands out in my mind as
essential. Given that you have learned all the rules in a grammar book,
and all the basic vocabulary, you still face the following problem: if you
want to say something, there might in principle be dozens, hundreds, or
even infinitely many different ways to say it in the language—all equally
grammatical using basic vocabulary. But speakers would normally say
it in one particular way, out of all these options. The problem, then, is
knowing how one normally phrases things in the language. That’s a level
which tends to be absent in language instruction, because it is not just a
matter of grammar or of lexicon in the traditional sense. I cannot suggest
a practical solution to the problem, but it does need to be addressed.
Andor: However, talking about constituency, more particularly about the
compositionality of expressions, you suggest that “components are nei-
ther fixed nor predetermined in their semantic or phonological shape, but
are flexibly construed to accommodate adjacent elements and the overall
context; hence they may never have exactly the same value on any two
occasions” (Grammar and Conceptualization, 1999b, 152). How can this
issue be tackled in discussing the representation of meaning and meaning
facets in dictionaries, that is, in sourcebooks of lexical organization and
—for the future, when frame-based—of lexical relations?
Langacker: Well, that’s a hard question. A first point is that there is
indeed something that one can call the linguistic meaning (or meanings)
of a lexical item. I emphasize flexibility in saying that what you can access
through a lexical item is indefinite in scope, that you can reach into any
associated domain of knowledge, and that you adjust and accommodate
a lexical item’s meaning to surrounding elements. These are not however
equivalent to saying that a lexical item has no definite meaning, or that it
can mean anything at all. It’s not the case that anything goes. You have
to avoid two equally wrong positions, and my formulation tries to do that.
One position is that the meaning of a lexical item is fixed, determined, and
quite limited, that we can figure out what it is, and that it’s distinct from
general knowledge. This is the classic view of the dictionary metaphor.
The representation is generally assumed to be fairly small, roughly the
size of actual dictionary entries (although Wierzbicka 1985 sometimes
formulates very lengthy—albeit still limited—definitions). It is often
conceived as being just a bundle of semantic features.
The other extreme is to say that, all right, since in the right context
we can construe a term as meaning almost anything, lexical items don’t
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have any fixed meanings. Things mean whatever we want them to mean.
This, I think, is just obviously wrong. People know that words have
meanings and that we stretch them to accommodate new circumstances.
This implies that there is something we start from, something we stretch
when needed.
So I talk about a lexical item being a structured and partially de-
termined way of accessing encyclopaedic knowledge. A particular lexical
item takes certain aspects of its referent (certain cognitive domains) as
being central to its characterization, and others more peripheral. If there
is no specific cut-off point as to what is potentially accessed through a
lexical item, at least there are degrees of centrality, as a particular lexical
item sets it up.
Which aspects of general knowledge tend to be evoked in using a
lexical item is to some degree conventionalized. There is a gradation
perhaps, but access is partially structured instead of random. At various
places I give specific examples. My classic case is roe vs. caviar. If you
think about it, we can access the total body of knowledge associated
with either lexical item through the other one. People who know what
caviar is know that it’s made out of fish eggs, which is also called roe; and
people who talk about fish eggs and use the term roe know it can be made
into caviar. Effectively, then, the relevant portion of our encyclopaedic
knowledge base is really the same for both. But if you use the term caviar,
you expect it to more saliently invoke the finished product, the notion of
expense and fancy parties, and all that. If you use the term roe, you are
expected to be talking about fish reproduction, as opposed to what you
eat on crackers at fancy parties. It takes some work to contravene those
tendencies, as each lexical item accesses the same overall knowledge base
from different directions. That’s conventional, that’s linguistic, that’s
built into what we can call the linguistic values of these lexical items. It
is not a matter of their meanings being encapsulated, but rather of the
different kind of access they afford to the shared knowledge base. This
constitutes a difference in meaning.
Given that lexical items do have conventional meanings, it is still
the case that context determines how in particular they are likely to be
construed. This includes the effect of adjacent items that you alluded to
in the passage quoted. Now, how to represent that in dictionaries, well, I
don’t know. Maybe dictionaries could do a better job of making it clear
that lexemes give access to domains of independent knowledge, instead
of just providing a concise definition. I’m not sure how that could be
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done. I think dictionaries are a little bit misleading by trying, in just a
couple of lines, to offer a verbal definition which supposedly represents a
lexeme’s meaning. But a typical definition is not the sort of thing anyone
would ever say. Dictionary definitions have a certain style, and they don’t
clearly indicate that we are accessing structured bodies of knowledge in
a certain way.
I have just one other comment on these practical matters (which I
have not thought about in any depth). It is simply that people are very
adept at making sense of things, of flexibly construing lexical meanings
to accommodate adjacent elements and the overall context. They make
these adaptations so easily and automatically that they pose few problems
in a practical sense. So perhaps dictionary writers don’t have to worry
much about it.
Andor: The role of ‘domains’ plays a critical role in your theory, which
expresses the view that lexical items rank these domains. You also stress
that related senses of lexical items (see p. 4 of the book Grammar and
Conceptualization) comprise networks being linked by categorizing rela-
tionships. Let me quote: “[. . .] a lexical item evokes a set of cognitive
domains as the basis for its meaning, and exhibits considerable flexibility
in this regard. The access it affords is anything but random, however.
First of all, the domains a lexical item invokes are primarily limited to
those in which the entity it designates (i.e., its conceptual referent) fig-
ures directly. As part of its conventional value, moreover, a lexical item
ranks these domains: it accords them particular degrees of centrality [. . .]”
(Langacker 1999b, 4–5). All this certainly refers to the networks of con-
ceptual structures that provide the sources of a relevantly mapped lexical
representation. I mean, to networks such as scenes, frames, and scripts.
I would say, lexical items are saliently mapped in and from such struc-
tures of cognitive activity. Why don’t you use these terms referring to the
particular type of conceptual activity rather than the considerably opaque
term ‘domain’? And why don’t you use the notion of lexical-pragmatic
‘salience’, rather than ‘ranking a domain’?
Langacker: ‘Domain’ is not one of my favorite terms. I needed to invent
a lot of terms in formulating cognitive grammar, since there were so many
notions that had no names previously, and since I thought a lot of prior
terminology was infelicitous. Not every terminological choice I made to
meet those needs proved optimal over what is now almost three decades.
If I could invent the necessary terminology now, instead of having done so
25 years ago, I would make some other choices. So I don’t totally defend
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all the terms I use. But there was a reason for using ‘domain’ instead of
terms like ‘scene’, ‘frame’, or ‘script’, namely the need for a general term.
‘Script’ carries with it the notion of a sequence of actions, and that’s too
narrow. What I wanted was a general term to talk about meanings, or
the conceptual content of meanings (as opposed to construal). ‘Domain’
allows me to talk about meanings in a general and coherent way, without
making totally arbitrary divisions. For instance, we need to describe the
source of the conceptual content for, say, a color term, as well as for
something based on the restaurant script.
Andor: But how about ‘frames’? Isn’t that concept better for such pur-
poses? Frames could be understood to be quite general, as opposed to
scripts.
Langacker: You could also have included ‘idealized cognitive model’
(Lakoff 1987). Although Lakoff has said he understands the term ICM
very generally, it is still too narrow. ‘Frame’ does come closest to being
an adequate term. If I were doing things from scratch, I might well
adopt ‘frame’. But it would have to be in a totally general sense. Would
Fillmore say that color space is a frame?
Andor: That’s exactly the problem, that the term ‘frame’ has also been
extensively very much abused. A lot of people who were talking about
scripts and scenes and other kinds of scenarios, actually were thinking of
frames rather than these other domains. So it has also been extensively
abused, I should say. Which is a major problem. See Fillmore’s alter-
native proposal to checklist theories of meaning (1975), his early steps to
outline the theory of frame semantics (1982), and Schank and Abelson’s
classical work on frames (1977).
Langacker: Right. Fillmore uses ‘frames’, gives a list of things that he
calls frames in his paper on frame semantics, but he didn’t obviously cover
basic domains—e.g., time, space, color space—which are also crucial
to semantics. So that’s my reason for using ‘domain’: the need for a
general term. You also asked about ‘salience’ versus ‘ranking’. Those
are both very general terms covering certain aspects of construal. I have
no principled reason for using the latter instead of the former in regard
to domains.
Andor: Actually, for me, the most important aim was to clarify what
‘domains’ are and so on, using it as a general term, or perhaps, frame
could have been a better candidate. That was the issue I intended to raise
here.
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Langacker: Yes. There was a motivation, primarily the need to sub-
sume basic domains as well as non-basic domains under one term. Fill-
more was focusing on only certain kinds of notions as frames, though
obviously the term could be generalized.
Andor: I would also like to ask you about active zones, concerning their
role in serving as a discourse cohesive or coherence factor. In your work
on active zones that I have had a chance to study, starting with your 1984
paper that appeared in the Berkeley Linguistics Society meeting handbook
of that year up to fairly recent work, and also in Eve Sweetser’s 1999
paper with ample reference to your work, the role of active zones is dis-
cussed within the framework of utterances rather than in texts. Perhaps it
would be interesting to study their role in discourse organization, partic-
ularly as a discourse cohesive facet, and also as a factor in charge of the
economical nature of linguistic, particularly of discourse representation.
And we should also study their frame-related factors. Would this, in your
view, be a feasible research project?
Langacker: I could answer just by saying “yes”. But probably you
expect something more.
I think the areas you mention are part of using the notion of ‘active
zone’ in the first place. You cannot divorce this from questions of frames
or domains, obviously.
Andor: That’s exactly why I bring this up, from the point of view of
providing some sort of organizing principle, or the kind of thing applicable
for discourse interpretation.
Langacker: Yes. I don’t think I ever conceived of the notion active
zone as applying to utterances or spoken language, as opposed to texts.
It was meant to be general, for any kind of language production.
Andor: I brought this up because when you were talking about active
zones, you always had the utterance length kinds of structures highlighted.
Langacker: It is certainly true that I characterized active zones with
respect to a relational expression and its arguments; I talked about a
profiled relationship, and then the things that function as its trajector
or landmark. That’s the level at which I introduced the term and the
purpose for which I introduced it. This ties the notion to a particular
relational expression and associated nominals, e.g., a verb and then a
clause. Maybe you are raising the question of whether a particular clause
with a particular verb in it can be interpreted independently, or whether
you sometimes have to look at the whole discourse context in order to
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determine the active zones. Another possible question is whether there
might be some higher-level phenomenon that you could handle in a way
analogous to positing active zones for verbs. Those are two different
matters that could be investigated, but I haven’t really thought about
either one.
Andor: That’s exactly the thing. I am also thinking of cases of syn-
onymy. I have done quite extensive research in this issue. Taking verbs
of jumping, for instance, why exactly people use a given member of a syn-
onym set in a lexical field under the conditions of a certain context rather
than another. Why do we tend to use the prototypical member of a set to
overgeneralize, rather than use a specific one? Or, under what conditions
do we use a specific one rather than the prototype? So I was thinking
of a case where your concept of active zones could be very helpful in this
domain, saying that, for instance, in certain types of contexts, you would
choose to use a verb such as vault rather than jump. You would do that
on such grounds because of the context, without mentioning some inte-
gral elements that go together with the verb, such as pole, for instance.
I thought that choosing this particular verb rather than another one from
a synonym set in some way could be related to active zones, which would
provide the kinds of conditions relevant from the point of view of yielding,
contributing to discourse coherence. That was my idea.
Langacker: I think that has to be worked out with particular illustra-
tive examples to see concretely how it could be useful at that level. I do
think it’s worth looking at, it’s a reasonable idea. To say more, I’d have
to think in terms of specific cases.
Andor: Pursuing the topic of active zones a little bit further, let me
ask your opinion about whether I’m right to say that the way you address
active zones is closely related to the approach of certain pragmaticians,
including Jason Stanley, François Recanati, Kent Bach and others, and,
of course John Perry, in analyzing cases of unarticulated constituents,
for instance in utterances such as
(i) Mary took out her key and opened the door.
in which a bridging inference has to be made by the hearer, resulting in
with it or
(ii) He eats rabbit. (implying ‘rabbit meat’)
(iii) He wears rabbit. (implying ‘rabbit fur’),
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demonstrating cases of free enrichment? Actually, the above-mentioned
pragmaticians all happen to study the same examples that you analyze
related to the issue of active zones, such as
(iv) I finished the book.
(v) John heard the piano.
And others. See, for instance, Recanati (2004). Which analysis by both
parties, as I understand, refers to case-studies of the economy of linguistic
representation. Is this a correct understanding?
Langacker: I wouldn’t want to speak for those other analysts, because
this is a little bit outside my usual scope of reading. But I think it’s
a good characterization for my standpoint. Yes, economy of linguistic
representation is an important point here. As I tried to argue in talking
about some of these examples, if you tried to be fully precise, instead of
relying on the active zone phenomenon, you could never say anything.
You can always be more precise. Every linguistic expression has to be
oversimplified, and leave things out, and make a choice as to what will
be explicit, and rely on established scenarios, established frames, etc.
for people to fill in the details and make sense of it all. There are con-
ventionalized ways of doing that, as well as free, new ways of doing it.
This is all part of one big problem from my standpoint. The term ‘ac-
tive zone’, as I said, was invented to cover a fairly narrow phenomenon,
but I would never claim that the limitation is anything more than one
of convenience, and a matter of what happened to attract my attention
first. There is a danger in using the same term for too many things, in
which case you need more specialized terms to distinguish subcases that
are interesting for their own reasons. So there are different strategies
here. Some terms I tend to use fairly narrowly, even though they could
in principle be extended quite broadly. ‘Reference point’ is another one:
anything could be a reference point phenomenon, if you want to think
about it that way. But there are some things where that aspect is so
special and central that it seems best to confine the term to those cases,
at least for purposes of exposition. So that’s what I tend to do. ‘Active
zone’ is a term of that sort.
Andor: I would like to ask three more questions, time providing. The
first concerns your notional approach to ‘parts of speech’. You devoted
considerable effort to discussing the case of verbs and nouns. I would
particularly be interested in your way of thinking about the adjective cat-
egory, which you consider to be an atemporal relation, that is to say, a
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state, summary scanned (as described on pp. 78–9 of Concept, Image,
and Symbol (1990)). But first, what is your view about the predicative
use of adjectives representing cases of the [±stative/dynamic] distinction,
such as in
(vi) John is hard-working.
(vii) John is malicious
(viii) John is being malicious.
and the the classic examples of
(ix) John is careful.
(x) John is being careful (with the vase).
I guess you would say that these examples demonstrate cases of processes.
Langacker: Well, you are raising some fairly complex issues here, and
there’s a lot going on in these examples. So we have to approach them
from different angles.
First of all, I believe the characterization I gave is correct when fully
explicated. When I say that an adjective profiles an atemporal relation,
this doesn’t mean that time is not involved. For example, in adjectives
like early or late, time obviously is involved. What matters is how time is
involved. When I describe a verb as profiling a temporal relationship (or
‘process’), I mean by that two things. First, the relationship is conceived
as evolving or extending through time. And secondly, in accessing it and
using the expression as a verb, the relationship is scanned sequentially
through time as opposed to being scanned in summary fashion. So a
verb is temporal in both these senses: the profiled relation is conceived
as extending through time, and at some level of processing we access it
by scanning sequentially along that axis.
Time can perfectly well be involved in the first sense, but if we view
it in summary fashion, by definition it is atemporal, or better ‘non-
processual’, a term I generally use these days. Time is still involved,
just not involved in both ways figuring in the definition of a verb. That
is an important initial point of clarification.
Now, one thing we have to take account of is the fact that the ex-
amples you gave all contain the verb be. They do not use an adjective
by itself, they combine it with be. So all of these are full clauses, and I
would say that in every case what’s being profiled is a process.
Andor: In Hungarian you would have iterative suffixation added to the
root, and you would be using these words as verbs which have an adjectival
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base. In the Hungarian version of John is being stupid, for instance, you
have the word buta (the corresponding adjective for stupid), and you have
butáskodik (is being stupid), with rich morphology added to the root.
Langacker: That’s comparable to what you are doing here. In effect,
be is our English morphology. It’s just a separate word sometimes, to
some degree.
Andor: Under example (x), however, John is being careful with the
vase, you could just use János ügyes a vázával in Hungarian, which would
translate literally as John careful with the vase. That is, there would not
be any be there in Hungarian.
Langacker: Well, I have enough trouble analyzing English without
trying to analyze Hungarian, which I don’t know. So you are bringing
in still more complexities. I would not say that using an adjective to
head a clause, thereby construing it as a process, always requires some
overt morphological indication. That’s certainly not true. An adjectival
relationship can also be viewed as extending through time by virtue of
being plugged into a particular construction which imposes this construal.
It does not have to be done by a separate morphological element, but can
just be a matter of constructional meaning. However you are still doing
something beyond using the adjective in its basic sense. It just happens
that in English we have a particular way of doing this in a construction
which involves adding another verb.
So we have to strip away the contribution of be or that higher-level
construction and talk about the meaning of the adjective itself. Of course,
that’s not really feasible here totally, either. Let’s look at (viii) John is
being malicious and (x) John is being careful. Those are, I think, the same
phenomenon, as opposed to John is malicious, and John is careful. Here
again, we are starting with be malicious or be careful. But in (viii) and
(x) these are not being used alone. There is a higher level of organization
involved, and there are different ways of talking about it. What I want
to say about (viii) and (x) is that in each case the be + adjective combi-
nation is not being construed as an imperfective verb but as a perfective
verb. They profile bounded events. The overall event of be malicious is
bounded, and be careful is bounded. They are thus perfective processes.
We can say that this happens through a zero derivational process, or we
can talk about them as representing a special, higher-level construction,
making it an aspect of constructional meaning. I don’t have any favorite
way of talking about it at present. But the point is, if be careful or be
malicious in its basic sense describes a person having a certain prop-
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erty that extends indefinitely through time, in (viii) and (x) we have a
use designating an event, an occurrence, a manifestation of this property
through some bounded span of time. The sentences could be translated
as something like act malicious or act careful (although act is a bit too
strong). And because the complex predicate is construed as perfective, it
takes the progressive (which in English is limited to perfectives), which
has to be used for present time. There is thus a difference between just
ascribing or describing a property versus describing a manifestation of
a property in one bounded occurrence. That is what these particular
examples hinge on. I suppose Laura Michaelis would talk about this in
terms of ‘coercion’ by a higher-level construction, and I’m happy with
that, too. That’s one way that I could approach the phenomenon. So
you see, there are various dimensions to your question. We have cov-
ered several already. Did you have something with example (vi), John is
hard-working, other than what we’ve already discussed?
Andor: Well. . .
Langacker: Now, there is something very deep and important here
that I don’t yet have a good grasp of. That is this notion of a ‘property’.
First of all, any adjectival property, when it’s actually manifested, is
manifested through time, either a point in time or a time span of indefinite
extent. One way or another, time is involved in ascertaining or observing
an adjectival property. The temporal aspect is more salient in some
cases, e.g., in John is hard-working, as opposed to John is tall. Just by
glancing at a photograph we can see that John is tall. But for John is
hard-working, you have to observe him on various occasions for extended
periods. However, the two adjectives are parallel linguistically, in that
both of them designate the situation of that property being characteristic
of the person, as either a locally or globally valid ascription. That’s
different from the actual manifestation of the property, or the observation
and verification of it. You have to sort all these things out. What I
think is a rather deep and important problem, one I haven’t worked out
to my own satisfaction yet, is to specify what happens conceptually in
converting these various observations into the ascription of a constant
property.
Andor: Which is very exciting.
Langacker: Yes. And it’s not just adjectives. The same holds for
mental state predicates. For example, when I say that John believes that
X, probably at the moment I utter the sentence John isn’t even think-
ing about X. There are probably very few occasions in his life when he
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thinks about X, but he can still believe that X. So, having this belief is a
kind of stable property of John, or at least it’s something constant. But
it’s only occasionally manifested. So we have this difference between the
manifestation of something and the stable aspect of having it, whether
it’s a belief or a property like tall, hard-working, or whatever. Exactly
how to think about the conceptual step in going to that level is something
I’m not sure about yet. But clearly we do it, and it’s manifested linguis-
tically in the difference between perfective and imperfective expressions.
The resulting expressions (e.g., John is hard-working) are imperfective
in form, because we are talking about something that’s stable and fixed.
But what exactly is it that we are talking about? I know there are clas-
sic philosophical problems involved in this. I won’t address it from that
direction, but I’d like to address it from a conceptual direction in more
detail than I have in the past.
Andor: Studying the semantic value of possessive elements and posses-
sive constructions seems to be one of your favorite topics of investigation.
The most recent paper I read on this issue was a conference lecture given
as a plenary talk in Braga in 2003, published in 2004, in which, I believe
correctly, you expressed an anti-localistic view (Langacker 2004, 111–2),
opposing the views of case grammarians such as John Anderson (1971).
Here, I would like to inquire about your view concerning the pragmat-
ics of possessives in structures where the Saxon genitive or a possessive
pronoun is used. Let me take just three examples:
(xi) John’s dinner was very tasty.
(xii) Their knives were very sharp.
(xiii) Their film was very interesting.
All three demonstrate the same issue: the possessor can be understood
either as an Experiencer (perhaps even as a Locus, à la Anderson and
the localists), or as an active controller of an act of production, i.e., an
Agent. When asked to associate, informants show a significant difference
in making judgements about the role. How would you interpret, describe
this difference in interpretability in your own framework? Certainly, re-
ferring to some sort of an attenuation of the active controller role would
not work in such cases. The case is interesting, as we would be facing
exactly the same issue if the sentences were translated into Hungarian,
for instance.
Langacker: The problem I face here is how to answer that question
without delivering the entire paper. First of all, I think any of these
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sentences could be interpreted in lots of different ways, or any of the
nominals can certainly be interpreted in lots of different ways. So there
is nothing fixed about their interpretations. What you are alluding to
here are their default interpretations.
Andor: For instance, whether John prepared the dinner, or perhaps he
ate it.
Langacker: Right. You’d think of those interpretations, or maybe one
in particular, rather than dozens of other possibilities, e.g., that John’s
dinner is the one he is responsible for delivering or poisoning. Those
wouldn’t come to mind.
Andor: But still, when people are asked to associate, you know, one
rather than another type of association for a certain kind of context or
frame would pop out as most typical and perhaps most salient. I wonder
why that is. From among a number of chances available to them, people
still stick to certain sorts of things, they spontaneously recognize some
sort of saliency. Like in most cases, for instance, in the utterance Their
knives were very sharp, I believe they would typically think of the produc-
ers. Their dinner was very tasty for somebody who ate it or had it, or
something like that, rather than referring to somebody who prepared it.
But it’s a matter of interpretation within a domain or a frame.
Langacker: Right. All these invoke some frame, at least implicitly,
for their interpretation. You can bias it with the following adjective.
But even without the adjective, there are factors like familiar scenarios,
standard uses, and the frequency of occasions of talking about particular
kinds of things. These result in different degrees of salience for various
interpretations.
Andor: Let’s take one more of these examples, for instance, Their holi-
days were excellent, thinking of whether they are travel agents or perhaps
clients of them.
Langacker: Sure. Any plausible scenario you can come up affords a
viable interpretation, but for some interpretations it takes a lot more work
to construct an appropriate context. The kinds of factors mentioned bias
things in certain direction. Now, from my standpoint that’s interesting
and very true. But it wasn’t what I was talking about.
Andor: I know.
Langacker: The question I was addressing was: What can you say
about the meaning of this Saxon genitive construction in general? You
don’t want to list all the individual kinds of relationships there can be
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between possessor and possessed, and say that that’s all there is to it.
This won’t work, since there is no end to the possible relationships that
might be involved, if you are talking about things at the level of eating
something, making something, etc.
At the other extreme, you can say that there is no semantic value
at all that the possessive construction or the possessive morpheme has;
because it’s so varied, there is just no content that all uses share. And
if you’re strict about the word ‘content’, maybe I would agree with that,
but I wouldn’t agree that there is no shared meaning at all. Possessives
are not semantically vacuous. I think the possessive construction (and/or
the possessor morpheme) has a schematic meaning as well as prototypical
values. But the prototype could conceivably vary from noun to noun.
Obviously, only some things are likely to be owned, so ownership is only
relevant with certain kinds of nouns. There are only certain kinds of
things we make, and so forth. But what I try to show is that the reference
point model naturally accounts for the schematic level of characterization.
Secondly, I try to show that the reference point relationship—men-
tally accessing the target through the reference point—represents the
subjective construal of all of the objective kinds of relationships that are
typical of possessive constructions, including actively controlling some-
thing, or owning something, holding something, etc. Conceptually, those
relations (controlling something, holding something, making something,
seeing something, having exclusive access to something, etc.) are direc-
tional and asymmetrical. Conceptualizing them involves mentally ac-
cessing the possessor and the possessed successively, in that order. This
sequence is inherent in conceiving of X controlling Y , in any of those
varied ways. I assume that one crucial aspect of this conception is trac-
ing a mental path from X to Y : evoking X and then using that as a
basis for evoking X interacting with Y . Schematically, that’s all posses-
sion amounts to: first evoking the possessor, which makes it possible to
then evoke the possessed. This subjectively construed relationship is the
schematic value of the reference point relation, and that’s what all pos-
sessives have in common. The reason certain orders are natural, so that
we generally can’t reverse things and say, for instance, the dinner’s John,
is precisely that specific instantiations imply a certain directionality just
to apprehend them in the normal way.
Andor: My final question concerns the issue of linguistic modularity,
that of the human language faculty. Do you share the modular view of
language as outlined by Fodor (1983), that is, a view according to which
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there exists a language module which is encapsulated, its output repre-
sentation is shallow, and which does not communicate freely with other
modules or the central systemic units of processing? Or, perhaps, would
you sympathize with Jackendoff’s model of representational modularity,
which outlines a number of interfacing sub-modules of the linguistic sys-
tem (2002)? Once, on p. 13 of Vol. 1 of your groundbreaking work (1987),
you expressed the view that knowledge about language is not advanced or
mature enough to be able to tackle such issues. Do you still hold the same
view at the current level of the state of the art?
Langacker: I am uncomfortable with any modular view of language.
One reason this is tricky is that it’s clear that the brain is not just a
homogeneous bank of neurons. I mean, the brain is organized in a mod-
ular fashion in many respects. There are columns of neurons that do
particular things, areas of the brain that do particular things in coordi-
nated ways, and so forth. There is certainly modularity in how cognition
works at the brain level. And if you look at any particular linguistic
phenomenon, like a clause or just a noun phrase, you can talk about dif-
ferent features of it as independent problems of analysis. You can talk
about the problem of grounding, or of conceiving a physical object, or
the problem of categorization. Those are separate problems, and there
can be many such problems separable to some degree as issues. Linguists
have a tendency—if you question modularity—to cite cases like these as
showing the need for a modular view. There are however different things
that might be called modularity. The question is whether these include
the particular things that linguistic theorists like Fodor and Jackendoff
have been dedicated to. Is the language as a whole a module? Or partic-
ular subcomponents of a language, like lexicon, syntax, or morphology?
I think not, although I would not presume to have convincing arguments
that would sway the opinion of a modularist. This is a vast question,
and not one I feel qualified to focus on personally in my own work. I
think I’m pretty clear about the matter, if I wasn’t in 1987. I think those
particular kinds of modules are gratuitous from the linguistic standpoint.
I don’t believe, for example, in any distinction between the lexicon, as
people call it, and the syntax. I think it’s an erroneous distinction based
solely on tradition. That’s the clearest case. But the same holds for the
language as a whole. Certainly there are kinds of knowledge I consider
to be linguistic. But typically these result from drawing together and
exploiting independently existing phenomena. They are packaged in a
certain way, so the resulting package is specifically linguistic. But lin-
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guistic units are not independent of the rest. Encyclopaedic semantics is
an obvious and simple example. It just doesn’t make any sense to try and
separate what’s linguistic and what’s non-linguistic from the meaning of
a lexical item, for reasons argued in other places.
Here’s the way I like to think about such matters. It concerns both
modularity and the question of innateness, which, of course, is closely
tied up with it. We can start with this basic question: Is there an innate
language capacity, or an innate universal grammar? At one level the an-
swer is obviously “yes”. We have inborn bases for learning languages, we
have a compulsion to learn languages when we are children—that’s all
wired in. The next question is: Are these specifically linguistic? Or is it
all done on the basis of more general abilities? That leads to the issue of
whether there is a language module, which is a different question. There
is a universal basis for learning language, but certainly all kinds of other
knowledge and abilities have to be in place and contribute to learning
a language. These include pragmatic factors: being able to know that
people have intentions when they are speaking, and to apprehend those
intentions. These skills are typically ignored by Chomskyans when they
argue for the impossibility of learning languages. Obviously, language
learning cannot occur by itself; it requires a certain foundation. But
given this foundation, I believe it is all describable in terms of seman-
tic structures, phonological structures, and symbolic links between them.
There’s nothing special like a syntactic component with irreducible syn-
tactic primitives, etc. I am willing to believe that something specifically
linguistic is involved, not just general knowledge. I’m pretty sure that
we don’t learn languages just on the basis of general abilities. I think
we have a specific language learning capacity, which partially shapes lin-
guistic structure. But what is it that’s specifically linguistic? I don’t
believe there’s any particular content that’s specifically linguistic. The
analogy I like to draw is with the physical organs of speech. We pro-
duce speech with the lungs, the trachea, the vocal chords, the mouth,
the nose, the lips, the tongue, the teeth, and so forth. But these organs
of speech are all there for other reasons, independently of speech. In the
evolution of language they have been adapted, adjusted, and fine-tuned.
These adaptations are obviously innately specified—we’re born with the
vocal apparatus in a certain configuration that chimpanzees don’t have.
Still, nothing is physically involved that isn’t more broadly grounded and
doesn’t have other uses in the human organism. It is only the particular
detailed configuration this apparatus assumes, reflecting the particular
Acta Linguistica Hungarica 52, 2005
an interview with ronald langacker 363
adjustments that have occurred, which make it all work together to give
us articulate speech. These are innately specified, and specifically for
linguistic purposes. And for the rest of language, I’d like to think of it as
being analogous. Conceptualization, semantics, symbolization, and from
these grammar—they all rely on things which are independently there
and have other functions. But we do much more with them than we
could if it were not for innate specifications. It’s a matter of tweaking
the system, so to speak. And those tweaks are the specifically linguistic
innate specifications. Language is not modular in that sense. This is a
non-modular view of linguistic uniqueness.
Andor: We, who have followed the development of your cognitive gram-
mar paradigm with great attention on a regular basis, all know the starting
point, the initial motivations for it. All of us would now be greatly in-
terested in your plans to develop or extend your theory, and we would
like to know what are the topical issues of your research interest for the
immediate or the more distant future.
Langacker: I’d like to know that, too. It’s a hard question, since there
are major problems that need a lot of work. These include things I’ve
reflected on in recent work and have to be investigated at a deeper and
more extensive level. One is the need for a cognitive lexicography along
the lines of the constructs suggested in cognitive grammar. I am think-
ing of a program analogous to what Wierzbicka does with her natural
semantic metalanguage (1996). I cannot imagine personally undertaking
anything on a scale comparable to hers, examining so many lexical items
across so many languages. I would however like to work out representa-
tive areas of the lexicon in comparable semantic detail, specifically from
the cognitive grammar perspective. Since I’m now formally retired, there
may be time to have fun with this in coming years. It’s important to
see just what is involved.
Two themes have come up a lot in recent work. One is “fictivity”
(or “virtuality”), e.g., the fictive motion that Talmy (1996) and others
have written about. Fictivity is so extensive that I’m not convinced we
ever talk directly about actuality. Perhaps we always talk about fictive
entities, relating them to actuality only secondarily. But whether that’s
true or not, fictivity is a certainly major theme which I’ve written about
a lot. I suspect we are only beginning to understand its pervasiveness
in language.
Next is “dynamicity”, a term that alludes to the time course of any
conceptualization. It extends naturally to the time course of conceiving
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the form and meaning of a complex expression, like a clause or a sentence.
And that shades into questions of grammatical processing— the time
course of it, what’s going on semantically at each stage, etc. Obviously
it also ties into discourse, which I am gradually becoming more involved
with. Eventually there needs to be a unified view of semantics, grammar,
processing, and discourse. While I have ideas along these lines, they are
far from being well-developed or ready to present in detail.
Those are some big themes in the back of my mind. They are all very
closely related. In choosing topics, I generally work on what I have to at a
certain period in order to get a paper ready for a conference or a volume.
In a sense these practical matters drive the agenda. But the topics are all
related and mutually informing, they push in the same general direction.
I think it has worked out pretty well and will continue to in the future.
In any case, the topics I mentioned should be quite important.
One concern is to make it clear how all of the specifics of the model
and this way of viewing grammar actually follow from an initial focus
on the social-interactive context of speech. It is actually fairly clear in
my work, if you really look at it. For instance, I talk about usage events
as the basis for all linguistic units, I talk about things like grounding,
which is where the speaker–hearer interaction meets grammar. All the
way through I have ways of accommodating the social side of things, the
cultural side of things, the interactive side of things, the discourse side
of things. But this has always been looked at in piecemeal fashion. I am
often accused of talking about pure conception and not focusing on these
issues. But if you look at the framework and what I actually have talked
about, that’s not really accurate.
One thing I’m gradually working around to, and hope to do seriously
at some point, is to articulate the framework in a way that starts with the
social–interactive and the contextual–cultural basis of language, showing
how the rest all emerges from it, instead of going in the other direction.
This may be more a matter of presentation than of different substance,
but I think it’s important to work it out along those lines.
Those are some major issues that I’ll be thinking about in the future.
Andor: And we might be expecting some more of those big volumes in
the future.
Langacker: Big ones, small ones, or articles, I don’t know. But cer-
tainly I’ll keep writing for a while.
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Andor: You are a very happy man, I should say, having these kinds
of ambitions which, I think, is great for somebody who is working as
seriously as you do on these issues.
Langacker: Well, I think I’m actually just getting started, in terms of
figuring out these problems.
Andor: But this is exactly the fantastic thing about it. So, Ron, thank
you very much for giving me this interview. It certainly has significantly
enriched my understanding of your theory and I do very much hope that
it will influence its readers in the same way.
Langacker: Thank you for taking the time, as well as for the interest
and all the preparation.
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